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The poverty rate and income transfer are clearly correlated. However, not much research has attempted to 
determine the causal linkage between the two. Previous research has primarily focused on the poverty-
reducing impact of income transfer. In this paper, we apply a simultaneous equation system of spatial 
regressions to uncover the spatial pattern of the relationship between the poverty rate and income transfer, 
using a sample of 3,001 U.S. counties. The results are in line with theoretical expectations; they provide 
evidence of a significant simultaneity effect between the poverty rate and income transfer. Our findings 
also confirm the presence of significant spatial autocorrelation. Contrary to previous studies, we find that 
more generous counties tend to do a better job of reducing poverty and that counties with more poor tend 
to be less generous, creating incentive for the poor to participate in the labor force.  Furthermore, counties 
located in devolution states perform better in both poverty reduction and income transfer. These findings 
are missing from extant literature that focuses only on the poverty-reducing impact of welfare payments.  




A previous version of this paper was presented at the IVth World Conference of the Spatial Econometrics 
Association, Chicago, Illinois, June 9-12, 2010.   
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
That income transfer reduces poverty has been a longstanding and lingering debate (O’Neill 1986; 
Kenworthy 1999; Herzer and Klump 2009). While a considerable amount of research has focused on the 
poverty-reducing impact of income transfer, the role of the poverty level in the policymaking decision to 
determine the level of transfer has been largely ignored. Furthermore, the amount counties spent on 
income transfer across the United States varies considerably. Some counties are spending rather 
generously, while other counties are maintaining only the required level of spending, despite high and 
persistent poverty rates and the availability of federal and often state funds. A recent study by Lobao and 
Kraybill (2009) has elaborately analyzed the impact of poverty on economic development and service 
provision activities put forth by local governments to boost their communities but failed to account for the 
effect of income transfer on poverty dynamics. Even more surprising, as of this study, no research has 
attempted to characterize the interrelationship between poverty and transfer payments. It is clear that the 
levels of government income transfer vary in response to the level of poverty (Hoynes, Page, and Stevens 
2005; Caminada et al. 2010). In this study, we are primarily concerned with the interdependence between 
the poverty rate and income transfer. It is worth pointing out that the literature is predominantly 
inconclusive on the potential impact of poverty on income transfer. Some critics contend that high 
poverty levels may compel local governments to engage in a race to the bottom by trading off between 
growth and redistributive activities. Others argue that the penalty of poverty may induce communities to 
be generously liberal when setting up income transfer levels.  
To assess these contentions, while at the same time analyzing the interdependence between the 
poverty rate and income transfer, we apply a simultaneous equation framework in a spatial context. Our 
method is rooted in the theoretical model of welfare competition among local governments.  The 
empirical implementation draws from recent applications of spatial econometrics in a multi-equation 
framework by Jeanty, Partridge, and Irwin (2010); Gebremarian et al. (2008); and Boarnet (1994).   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we present a review of the literature on 
antipoverty strategies and its application in the United States. Sections 3 and 4 discuss the theoretical 
framework, empirical specification, and econometric issues.  Section 5 describes the data. Section 6 
discusses the empirical results, diagnostic tests, and interpretation. Section 7 concludes the paper.  
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2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
To address poverty issues, Drèze and Sen (1991) identify two distinct but interrelated roles for public 
policy. First is the promotional role, which aims at eliminating chronic poverty by enhancing the asset 
base of households. Second is the protective role, which aims to prevent those households most 
vulnerable to adverse shocks from entering into a spiral of poverty. As Norton, Conway, and Foster 
(2000) put it, the rationale for implementing welfare programs or social safety nets is to promote 
dynamic, cohesive, stable societies through increased equity and security. Haddad and Zeller (1996) point 
out that social safety nets are designed to reduce poverty and to protect the income entitlements of 
particularly vulnerable groups during times of severe stress. Subbarao et al. (1996) define social safety 
nets as programs to protect a person or household against chronic incapacity to work and a decline in this 
capacity from a marginal situation that provides a minimal livelihood for survival with few reserves. It 
follows that social safety net programs should apply to contexts of sudden income or consumption 
collapse with potentially catastrophic consequences (Devereux 2002).  For many households in poverty, 
such programs are the only hope of a life free from chronic poverty, malnutrition, and disease (Coady 
2004). Traditionally, welfare programs are designed to serve two key functions: (1) to transfer resources 
toward the poorer members of society to bring them out of poverty, and (2) to provide greater 
opportunities for individuals to mitigate risks from random events.  
Safety nets protect individuals from transient periods of poverty as a result of random shocks 
such as loss of employment, sudden illness, or natural disasters (Besley, Burgess, and Rasul 2003). They 
also serve to protect individuals from lifetime poverty that can arise from lack of assets such as human 
capital and physical capital. Hence, social safety nets target three rather heterogeneous groups: (1) the 
chronic poor, who have limited access to income and instruments to manage risk. For these households, 
even small reductions in income can have dire consequences; (2) the transient poor, whose income is near 
the poverty line and may fall into poverty when an individual household or the economy as a whole faces 
hard times; and (3) those with special circumstances whose vulnerability may stem from disability, 
discrimination, displacement, "social pathologies" of drug and alcohol abuse, domestic violence, or crime 
(World Bank 2007).  The heterogeneity of poor households determines the nature and design of social 
safety net programs. In Table 2.1, Devereux (2002) provides an example of correspondence between the 
nature of poverty and possible antipoverty interventions.   
Table 2.1—Poverty determinants and antipoverty interventions 
Determinants of poverty  Antipoverty interventions 
Low productivity 
  (chronically low returns to labor) 
Income generation schemes 
  (productivity-enhancing interventions) 
Vulnerability 
  (transitorily low returns to labor) 
Safety nets 
  (direct transfers, productivity-restoring 
interventions, or consumption-smoothing 
microfinance) 
Dependency 
  (inability to work) 
Social welfare 
  (direct transfers) 
Source: Devereux (2002).  
Devereux (2002) argues that low productivity that causes chronic poverty is best addressed 
through productivity-enhancing interventions such as irrigation programs and rural infrastructure 
development. In the short term, vulnerability that leads to transient poverty is best addressed through 
social safety nets such as cash or in-kind transfers. However, dependency cannot be solved by 
productivity-enhancing interventions; direct transfers toward the poor should be more efficient.   
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Social safety net programs can take the form of cash transfers such as pensions, child allowances, 
or unemployment benefits. They can also be in-kind transfers of commodities such as food subsidies, 
housing subsidies, or energy subsidies. Some variant may provide income indirectly by offering 
vulnerable groups employment in public works programs or, more broadly, by providing services such as 
health and education (Besley, Burgess, and Rasul 2003). Incorporating the notion of income volatility and 
poverty dynamics, Pritchett (2005) argues that income volatility creates the demand not just for transfer 
programs to those whose incomes are chronically low (safety nets), but also for insurance-like schemes 
that would pay off not only when income is absolutely low, but also when households experience 
negative shocks (safety ropes). Thus, while a “safety net” program might be more popular the more 
effectively it transfers from richer to poorer households, a “safety rope” program might cause little net 
redistribution but be popular because it serves an important insurance function in transferring resources 
from good states to bad states. This distinction is crucial in understanding the political economy of 
welfare programs. 
How to design antipoverty schemes has always been a dilemma. Should the government provide 
poor people with enough income to cover basic needs such as food, shelter, and clothing or instead focus 
on improving local opportunities that help the poor accumulate more assets? In the United States, while 
social insurance improves opportunities for poor families, limited public assistance provides support to 
cover their basic needs. 
Antipoverty policy in the United States revolves around the provision of safety nets to bail out 
socially disadvantaged households in the presence of short-term shocks (Barrett and Swallow 2006). 
Research on the impact of welfare on poverty rates can be grouped into two categories. In one category 
are studies contending that welfare decreases poverty by raising the income of the poor above poverty 
thresholds, and, in another, are those claiming that welfare has no impact on poverty. Peterson and Rom 
(1989); Osberg (2000); Hoynes, Page, and Stevens (2005); and others find a significant positive 
correlation between government transfers and changes in the poverty rate. For example, Schoeni and 
Blank (2000) find evidence that welfare policy changes introduced in 1996 have reduced public assistance 
participation while increasing family earnings; as a result, poverty declined. Lichter and Jensen (2002) 
show that since the introduction of the 1996 reform act, rural poverty rates have declined among female-
headed families along with the rates of welfare receipts. Moreover, labor force participation has increased 
as well as average earnings. In a cross-country analysis, Kenworthy (1999) finds that social-welfare 
policies do help to reduce poverty; however, he points out that the welfare programs in the United States 
are less effective than those in other industrialized countries.  
Moffitt and Rangarajan (1991) provide evidence suggesting that increases in the Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children (AFDC) program tax rate was not an effective tool for increasing labor supply 
and work incentives of female heads. Reviewing the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act , Danziger (2002)  concludes that many recipients reach time limits without finding 
stable jobs even in the presence of favorable economic conditions. Iceland (2003) points out that although 
the majority of welfare leavers are working, they usually have low-wage jobs so that their earnings 
remain low. As a result, many remain in poverty for awhile after leaving welfare.  
Analyzing the impact of welfare transfers, Fremstad (2004) concludes that 
•  between 50 to 75 percent of those leaving welfare remain poor two-to-three years after 
leaving welfare; 
•  42 percent of those leaving welfare remain poor for about five years after leaving welfare, 
compared with 55 percent who are living at the poverty rate in the first year after leaving 
welfare; and 
•  the net income of those leaving welfare in the year after they exited welfare is lower than 
their income prior to leaving. 
Using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 in the United States (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 2008), Ulimwengu (2008) found that, in general, employed individuals who choose not to  
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participate in welfare programs have at least a 50 percent chance of moving out of persistent poverty. By 
contrast, unemployed individuals have almost no chance of escaping persistent poverty if they choose not 
to participate in welfare programs. Work disincentive effects for Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children–Unemployed Parent (AFDC–UP) participants ranged from a loss of 42 to 50 hours per month 
for husbands and a loss of 29 to 33 hours per month for wives (Hoynes 1996). However, for those not 
included in the AFDC–UP, most families would still fail to increase earnings sufficiently to replace any 
resulting loss in income as a result of their lack of participation in the program. 
Most of these studies fail to account for geographical spillovers of both poverty and transfer, 
which may lead to biased estimates and erroneous policy recommendations. In addition, the causal effect 
of the poverty rate on the level of transfer is often ignored. In the next section, we present a theoretical 
framework that incorporates geographical spillover across local jurisdictions and cross-correlation 
between poverty and income transfer. As Lobao and Kraybill (2009) point out, county governments merit 
consideration in studying the determinants of poverty and appraising the programs and policies that 
improve well-being across U.S. jurisdictions. Indeed, they found that even poorer communities can take 
steps to build local capacity, resources, and networks that expand programs for local businesses and low-
wage people.  
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3.  ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
The focal point of the present model is the essential interdependencies between the poverty rate and 
income transfer level in a spatial framework. Following Brueckner (2000), the model of welfare 
competition between jurisdictions can be adapted to derive an explicit spatial simultaneous model for 
poverty and income transfer. Let us assume that a lump-sum transfer 𝑏𝑖 is provided to socially 
disadvantaged families in jurisdiction i. These poor families work at low-skill jobs, receiving a wage of 
𝑤(𝐿𝑖), where 𝐿𝑖 represents the poor population in jurisdiction i with 𝜕𝑤 𝜕𝐿𝑖 ⁄ < 0. It follows that the poor 
families receive a gross income of 𝑤(𝐿𝑖) + 𝑏𝑖 ≡ 𝐺𝑖 in jurisdiction i. In equilibrium, the distribution of the 
poor population must satisfy the following: 
  𝑤�𝐿𝑗� + 𝑏𝑗 ≡ 𝐺, j = 1,…,n, and  (1) 
  ∑ 𝐿𝑗
𝑛
𝑗 = 𝐿 �,  (2) 
where G is the endogenous, uniform equilibrium level of gross income across jurisdictions, and 𝐿 � is the 
total number of poor in the economy. Solving (1) and (2) yields solutions for both G and 𝐿𝑗, j = 1,…, n, as 
functions of transfers in all jurisdictions. Explicitly, the optimal number of poor families in jurisdictions i 
is given by  
  𝐿 = 𝐻�𝑏𝑖,𝑏𝑗�  (3) 
where 𝐻𝑏𝑖 > 0, meaning that jurisdiction i’s poor population increases when social transfers in 
jurisdiction i rises. 
In jurisdiction i, the individual utility function to be maximized is given by 𝑈 = (𝑐𝑖,𝐺𝑖,𝑋𝑖) 
associated with a budget constraint 𝑐𝑖 = 𝑔𝑖 − 𝑏𝑖𝐿𝑖 𝑚 ⁄ , where m is the uniform number of taxpayers in 
each jurisdiction, 𝑋𝑖is a vector of characteristics of jurisdictions i endogenously determined in the model, 
𝑐𝑖is the level of private consumption, and 𝑦𝑖, the exogenous individual income. Substituting for 𝑐𝑖, 𝐺𝑖, and 
𝐿𝑖, the objective function becomes 
𝑈[𝑔𝑖 − 𝑏𝑖𝐿𝑖 𝑚 ⁄ ,𝑤(𝐿𝑖) + 𝑏𝑖;𝑋𝑖] = 𝑈�𝑔𝑖 − 𝑏𝑖𝐻�𝑏𝑖,𝑏𝑗� 𝑚 ⁄ ,𝑤�𝐻�𝑏𝑖,𝑏𝑗�� + 𝑏𝑖;𝑋𝑖� ≡ 𝑉�𝑏𝑖,𝑏𝑗;𝑋𝑖�.  (4) 
Thus, in choosing the optimal level of transfer 𝑏𝑖
∗, jurisdictions account for the inflow of the poor 
families caused by a higher transfer, which ultimately moderates the incentive for redistribution. 
Jurisdiction i chooses 𝑏𝑖
∗, to maximize equation (4) by setting 𝜕𝑉 𝜕𝑏𝑖 ⁄ = 0 , which depends on 𝑏𝑗 and 𝑋𝑖; 
thus, the optimal 𝑏𝑖
∗will also depend on welfare benefits elsewhere (𝑏𝑗
∗) and on jurisdiction i’s 
characteristics and can be written as  
  𝑏𝑖 = 𝑅�𝑏𝑗;𝑋𝑖�.  (5) 
Substituting equation (5) in (3) yields
1 
  𝐿 = 𝐻�𝑅�𝑏𝑗;𝑋𝑖�;𝑅�𝑏𝑖;𝑋𝑗�� = 𝑃�𝐿𝑗;𝑋𝑖�  (6) 
Equation (6) states that the poor population in jurisdiction i depends on poor population in other 
jurisdictions as well as on jurisdiction i’s characteristics.  
                                                       
1 From equation (3), 𝑏𝑗 = 𝐹(𝐿𝑖,𝑏𝑖), which when substituted in (5) yields  𝑏𝑖 = 𝐹(𝐿𝑖,𝑋𝑖), meaning that the level of transfer 
depends also on the number of the poor.  
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Empirical Model and Econometrics Issues 
Consistent with the theoretical model developed above, we consider the following system of equations: 
  𝑦𝑔 = 𝑌 𝑔𝜃𝑔 + 𝜌𝑔𝑊𝑦𝑔 + 𝑋𝑔𝗽𝑔 + 𝜀𝑔, with g = 1,…, M ,  (7) 
where in the g
th equation, yg is the 𝑛 × 1 vector of cross-sectional observations on the dependent variable,  
Xg is an 𝑛  ×  𝑘 vector of cross-sectional observations on k exogenous variables, 𝑌 𝑔 is  a corresponding 
𝑛  ×  𝐿 matrix of observations on L endogenous variables, εg is the 𝑛 × 1 disturbance vector with zero 
mean, 𝜌𝑔 is the spatial autoregressive parameter, W is an 𝑛 × 𝑛 spatial weights matrix of known 
constants, and  θg and βg  are regression parameters. The error term εg is allowed to be spatially correlated 
with a spatial structure of unknown form;  𝜀𝑔,𝑖 is expected to be correlated with 𝜀𝑔,𝑗 when the areal units i 
and j are proximate. The residuals across equations 𝜀𝑔,𝑖 and 𝜀𝑚,𝑖 (𝑔 ≠ 𝑚) may also be correlated. But, we 
adopt a limited information instrumental variable approach. 
Here M = 2, where y1 and y2 represent 2007 poverty rate and log of 2007 per capita income 
transfer  in a given county, respectively. Reverse the order of these two variables for Y1 and Y2. We 
proceed with a spatial econometrics approach by estimating non-spatial models that are in turn scrutinized 
for spatial dependence.  
To account for spatial autocorrelation in a lattice data analysis, a spatial weights matrix defining 
the neighborhood structure for each location is required. Unfortunately, theory provides little guidance 
with respect to choosing the correct weights matrix. We elect to use a first-order queen contiguity spatial 
weights matrix.
2 Analysis of extant county economic data suggests that neighborhood influences extend 
out approximately 40–50 miles and then dampen appreciably (Wheeler 2001). Our attempt to create a 
spatial weights matrix using a 50-mile distance cutoff results in 65 counties, located mostly in the western 
United States, having no neighbors. However, in the eastern United States, where counties are 
geographically small, this distance would in some instances pick up second-order neighbors (that is, 
neighbors of neighbors). As is customary in spatial econometrics analysis, the spatial weights matrix is 
row-standardized so that 𝑊 ∗ 𝑖𝑛 = 𝑖𝑛, where 𝑖𝑛 is an 𝑛 × 1 column vector with elements equal to one. 
We first ignore endogeneity due to reverse causality and the presence of a spatially lagged 
variable by estimating each equation using ordinary least squares (OLS) and assess the presence of spatial 
autocorrelation using Lagrange multiplier (LM) test statistics for error and lag dependence (Anselin 
1988), as well as their robust forms (Anselin 2001). The test results show strong evidence of residual 
spatial autocorrelation in the form of a spatial lag.  
Second, we allow for feedback simultaneity or reverse causality but ignore spatial autoregressive 
lag simultaneity to estimate the model using standard two-stage least squares techniques (2SLS) (model 
2). In this case, poverty rate and income transfer are allowed to be simultaneously determined, where 
identification of each equation rests on exclusion restrictions. The 2SLS residuals are tested for spatial 
dependence using the instrumental variable (IV) -Moran’s I and IV-Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests 
described in Anselin and Kelejian (1997). We also carry out diagnostic tests for endogeneity. Since both 
sets of tests reject the null hypotheses of no spatial autocorrelation and no endogeneity, a spatially lagged 
dependent variable is added in each respective equation in addition to the endogenous variable. Each 
equation is now estimated using spatial S2SLS (Kelejian and Prucha1998; Kelejian and Prucha 2004). 
While estimation of the OLS and 2SLS regressions is straightforward, the spatial 2SLS estimation 
warrants some attention because of the combination of the (non-spatial) endogenous variable and the 
spatially lagged dependent variable in each equation. 
Consider each equation in a compact form for ease of exposition.  
                                                       
2 In a queen contiguity spatial weights matrix, two locations (i and j) are considered neighbors if they share a common 
border or a common vertex, in which case Wij=1. 
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  𝑦𝑔 = 𝑍𝑔𝗿𝑔 + 𝜀𝑔  (8) 





Spatial Two-Stage Least Squares  
Let Q be an 𝑛 × 𝑝 matrix of instruments constructed as a function of X and W. To allow for the 
endogenous variables Yj, in addition to the spatially lagged variable in the j equation, we set 𝑋 = 𝑋1  ∪
 𝑋2, such that common elements in X1 and X2 are included in X once. Under the assumption that �𝜌𝑔� < 1, 
Kelejian and Prucha (1998; 2004) show that it is reasonable to take Q to  be a subset of the linearly 
independent columns of (𝑋,𝑊𝑋,…,𝑊𝑠𝑋). 3. Other optimal instruments have recently been proposed in 
Lee (2003) and Kelejian, Prucha, and Yuzefovich (2004). However, Monte Carlo experiments suggest 
that the overall performances of the estimators using different forms of instruments were very similar, 
giving preference to the computationally simpler set of instruments.
4  
Define 𝑃 = 𝑄(𝑄′𝑄)−1𝑄′ and 𝑍 ̂𝑔 = 𝑃𝑍𝑔;, then the spatial two-stage estimator has the following 
form: 
  𝗿 ̂2𝑆𝐿𝑆𝑔 = ( 𝑍 ̂𝑔
′𝑍𝑔)−1𝑍 ̂𝑔
′𝑦𝑔.  (9) 
If the weights matrix in each of the respective spatial lag models underbounds the true spatial 
interaction in the data, there will be remaining spatial error autocorrelation. Hence, the spatial 2SLS 
residuals are scrutinized for any remaining spatial error autocorrelation, using the generalized LM test 
suggested by Anselin and Kelejian (1997). While the transfer equation rejects the null hypothesis of no 
spatial autocorrelation, the poverty equation does not. 
To address the remaining spatial autocorrelation in the transfer equation, we employ the feasible 
generalized spatial 2SLS estimator (Kelejian and Prucha 1998). We supplement this with the 
nonparametric spatial heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (SHAC) estimator of the 
variance–covariance matrix recently proposed by Kelejian and Prucha (2007).  
Using equation (9) as a starting point, the asymptotic distribution of 𝗿 ̂2 = 𝗿 ̂2𝑆𝐿𝑆2 involves the 
variance–covariance matrix: Ψ = 𝑛−1𝑄′Σ𝑄, where Σ = �𝜎𝑖𝑗� = 𝐸𝜀2𝜀2
′. Let 𝜀̂2 = 𝑦2 − 𝑍2𝗿 ̂2 and Ψ � be the 
estimator of Ψ. Kelejian and Prucha (2007) show that the elements (r, s) of Ψ � are given by 
  Ψ �(𝑟,𝑠) = 𝑛−1∑ ∑ 𝑞𝑖𝑟𝑞𝑗𝑠𝜀̂2𝑖𝜀̂2𝑗𝐾(𝑑𝑖𝑗 𝑑 ⁄ 𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑖=1 ),  (10) 
where dij is the distance between county i and county j, K(.) is a kernel function with the usual properties, 
d is the bandwidth, such that 𝐾�𝑑𝑖𝑗 𝑑 ⁄ � = 0 for 𝑑𝑖𝑗 ≥ 𝑑. Following Kelejian and Prucha (2007), we focus 
on the Parzen kernel but experiment with two other kernels, Barlett and Epanechnikov, for a robustness 
check. The bandwidth is set to 19.59397, 31.26269, and 57.41537 miles, corresponding to 7, 14, and 40 
neighbors, respectively.  
With Ψ � at hand, the HAC variance for 𝗿 ̂2 is given by 





′𝑍 ̂2)−1.  (11) 
                                                       
3 The spatial lag of the constant term is not taken, since doing so would result in a column of ones when W is row-
standardized. We choose  𝑠 = 2. 
4 Lee’s (2003) optimal instruments involving the inverse of an 𝑁  ×  𝑁 matrix would be computationally burdensome.  
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Data Sources and Variables 
This study uses a sample of 3,001 U.S. counties as units of analysis. To study poverty and particularly 
income transfers, counties remain the most conceptually relevant units (Isserman, Feser, and Warren 2009 
and Peters 2009). As local governments, counties are increasingly recognized as the fastest-growing 
general purpose governments partly due to devolution (Lobao and Kraybill 2005). Using the Getis-Ord 
(1996) Z-score, we map the spatial pattern of both poverty rates and income transfer. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 
both display significant clusters of poverty.  The white spots represent high concentrations of poverty 
rates and income transfers, while the black spots represent low levels of the two variables.   
Figure 3.1—Spatial pattern of poverty in 2007 (Getis-Ord Z-score)  
     
Source: Authors’ estimation. 
Figure 3.2—Spatial pattern of income transfer in 2007 (Getis-Ord Z-score)  
 
Source: Authors’ estimation.  
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The data are taken from various sources, including the U.S. Census Bureau, the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, and the 1997 Census of Governments. Table 3.1 presents the list of variables as they 
pertain to each equation, variable definitions, and data sources. Extant research on poverty provides a 
good background when it comes to choosing the control variables in the poverty equation. A recent 
review of this literature can be found in Peters (2009). We select among the variables that have been 
unanimously found to affect poverty. First, we include a time-lagged variable, the 1997 poverty rate, to 
account for potential inertia effects. Allowing for a time lag also helps control for any fixed effects that 
persist over time.  
Second, we include two agglomeration economies variables:  log of population density and 
distance to the nearest metropolitan area. Population density is included to capture any returns to scale 
that may be present in high density areas. Distance to the nearest metropolitan area controls for the rural–
urban and urban–rural spillovers (Partridge and Rickman 2008). We expect a positive distance effect on 
poverty, based on the assumption that distance decreases labor demand more than it could possibly reduce 
labor supply, therefore reducing employment and wages. Further, a number of studies point to a spatial 
mismatch between workers and jobs in poorer and more rural counties, reducing the chance of welfare 
recipients to find employment (see, for example, Gibbs 2002; Lichter and Jensen 2002). Thus, we 
anticipated a positive relationship between the poverty rate and distance to the nearest metropolitan area, 
expecting that fewer work opportunities would lead to higher poverty rates. We include the 2000 county 
unemployment rate to capture location-specific labor market conditions.  
The literature on poverty also points to several demographic traits of counties generally found to 
influence poverty outcomes. We include both the percent of the population under age 18 and the percent 
over 64 to control for the proportion of the population out of the labor force. Households headed by single 
females  as a proportion of all households and the percent of adults over 25 with at least a college degree 
are included to control for populations with low and high earnings, respectively.  While the presence of 
female-headed households is expected to increase poverty, higher education attainment should reduce 
poverty. These variables take on 2000 values to avoid potential endogeneity. Finally, it is highly 
recognized that counties located in states devolving welfare programs to local governments gain more 
control over funds that county officials can apportion to jobs and business attractions in order to combat 
poverty (Tickamyer et al. 2007). Evidence from state-level studies also suggests that states playing a 
pioneer role in devolving welfare programs to counties appear to do a better job at creating jobs for their 
welfare recipients (Rodgers 2005). We include a dummy variable equal to one if the county is located in a 
state where welfare is devolved to county government and zero otherwise.  
Regarding the income transfer equation, as previously mentioned, existing empirical research 
focusing directly on the determinants of income transfer levels is relatively meager. In line with the 
theoretical framework used in this paper, this equation is based on the premise that, in setting the optimal 
level of income transfer, local governments account for the inflow of the poor and the characteristics of 
their jurisdictions. Thus, we include characteristics of both individuals and jurisdictions to reflect both 
demand and supply sides.  
First, as in the poverty equation, per capita income transfer in 1997 is included to capture inertia 
or path dependency. Findings by Lobao (2007) and Reese (2006) indicate that counties having a history 
of providing greater support for the poor will continue to do so. However, to provide income transfer for 
the disadvantaged groups in their populations, county governments must have the wherewithal to do so. 
Principally, they must possess adequate and autonomous resources. To capture the county government 
capacity for providing transfer services, we include per capita local government tax revenue and the ratio 
of county revenue to state and federal revenue.  
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Table 3.1—Data sources and variable descriptions 
Variable  Description  Poverty 
equation 
Transfer 
equation  Source 
Dependent   
povrt07  Population poverty rate (%), 2007 
  (+/-)  US Census: SAIPE 
(Small Area Income 
and Poverty 
Estimates) 
lpctanf07  Log of per capita TANF
5, 2007  (+/-)    US Census (REIS-
BEA
6 2009) 
Independent   
Time lag   
povrt97  Population poverty rate (%), 1997  (+)    US Census 
lpctanf97  Log of per capita TANF ($), 1997    (+)  REIS-BEA 
Agglomeration         
lpopdens00  Log of population density, 2000  (+/-)     
nearestma 
Distance (in km) to the nearest MSA 
(Metropolitan Statistical Area) as defined 
in 2000 
(+)   
Authors’ computation 
Economic   
lnpcpinc00  Log per capita personal income, 2000    (+/-)  US Census (REIS-
BEA) 
unemprt00  Unemployment rate (%) in 2000  (+)    U.S. Census Bureau  pctfem_un  Female unemployment rate (%), 2000    (+/-) 
Demographic   
pctu18  Percent of population under 18 years of 
age (%), 2000 
(+/-)   
U.S. Census Bureau 
pct65ov9  Percent of population 65 years or plus 
(%), 2000 
(+/-)   
bsgrad90  Percent of population with a college 
degree or plus (%), 1990 
(-)   
pffhhu18 
Percent % of female-headed family 
households with children <18 years (%), 
2000 
(+)   
Capacity   
devola  Dummy=1 if devolution and zero 
otherwise 
(-)  (+)  Lobao and Kraybill 
2005 
homerule 
Categorical: 1=Strong Dillon, 2=Weak 
Dillon, 3=Weak home rule, and 4=Strong 
home rule 
  (+/-) 
Salvino 2007 
revcap97  From Census of Governments, county 
general revenue per capita (1,000s), 1997 
  (+) 
1997 Census of 
Governments  fsown97 
From Census of Governments, 
federal+state revenue/county-own source 
revenue, 1997 
  (+/-) 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
Second, we include two agglomeration economies variables:  log of population density and 
distance to the nearest metropolitan area. Population density is included to capture any returns to scale 
that may be present in high density areas. Distance to the nearest metropolitan area controls for the rural–
urban and urban–rural spillovers (Partridge and Rickman 2008). We expect a positive distance effect on 
poverty, based on the assumption that distance decreases labor demand more than it could possibly reduce 
labor supply, therefore reducing employment and wages. Further, a number of studies point to a spatial 
mismatch between workers and jobs in poorer and more rural counties, reducing the chance of welfare 
recipients to find employment (see, for example, Gibbs 2002; Lichter and Jensen 2002). Thus, we 
                                                       
5 Temporary Assistance for Needy Families. 
6 Regional Economic Information System-Bureau of Economic Analysis.  
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anticipated a positive relationship between the poverty rate and distance to the nearest metropolitan area, 
expecting that fewer work opportunities would lead to higher poverty rates. We include the 2000 county 
unemployment rate to capture location-specific labor market conditions.  
The literature on poverty also points to several demographic traits of counties generally found to 
influence poverty outcomes. We include both the percent of the population under age 18 and the percent 
over 64 to control for the proportion of the population out of the labor force. Households headed by single 
females  as a proportion of all households and the percent of adults over 25 with at least a college degree 
are included to control for populations with low and high earnings, respectively.  While the presence of 
female-headed households is expected to increase poverty, higher education attainment should reduce 
poverty. These variables take on 2000 values to avoid potential endogeneity. Finally, it is highly 
recognized that counties located in states devolving welfare programs to local governments gain more 
control over funds that county officials can apportion to jobs and business attractions in order to combat 
poverty (Tickamyer et al. 2007). Evidence from state-level studies also suggests that states playing a 
pioneer role in devolving welfare programs to counties appear to do a better job at creating jobs for their 
welfare recipients (Rodgers 2005). We include a dummy variable equal to one if the county is located in a 
state where welfare is devolved to county government and zero otherwise.  
Regarding the income transfer equation, as previously mentioned, existing empirical research 
focusing directly on the determinants of income transfer levels is relatively meager. In line with the 
theoretical framework used in this paper, this equation is based on the premise that, in setting the optimal 
level of income transfer, local governments account for the inflow of the poor and the characteristics of 
their jurisdictions. Thus, we include characteristics of both individuals and jurisdictions to reflect both 
demand and supply sides.  
First, as in the poverty equation, per capita income transfer in 1997 is included to capture inertia 
or path dependency. Findings by Lobao (2007) and Reese (2006) indicate that counties having a history 
of providing greater support for the poor will continue to do so. However, to provide income transfer for 
the disadvantaged groups in their populations, county governments must have the wherewithal to do so. 
Principally, they must possess adequate and autonomous resources. To capture the county government 
capacity for providing transfer services, we include per capita local government tax revenue and the ratio 
of county revenue to state and federal revenue.  
Two other variables gauge the local governments’ ability to provide for its poor: devolution and 
home rule. Where welfare reform is devolved to counties, county governments have the potential to better 
serve the poor, if so inclined. Similarly, counties operating under home rule, as opposed to Dillon’s rule, 
have more leeway with respect to implementing more robust policies benefiting their citizens. Geon and 
Turnbull (2004) find that there is a greater tendency for counties under home rule to behave as if they are 
constrained to satisfy community demand as depicted by the median voter framework. 
Finally, where individuals are less dependent on income transfers, we expect the income transfer 
levels to be lower. We include per capita personal income to capture this segment of the population. We 
also include the percent of female unemployment to represent the part of the population with greater per 
capita dependence on income transfer. Here the effect can be a “race to the bottom” or a “race to the top.”    
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4.  ESTIMATION RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics and estimation results are presented in Tables 4.1 to 4.4. We start with non-spatial 
specifications where both OLS and 2SLS residuals are tested for spatial autocorrelation and the null 
hypothesis of no spatial autocorrelation is rejected for both. Then both equations are estimated using 
spatial two-stage least squares (S2SLS),  whose residuals are also tested for spatial autocorrelation to see 
whether including a spatial lag in each of the equations purges the residuals from spatial 
autocorrelation. The null hypothesis is rejected for the transfer equation but not for the poverty equation. 
We elect to correct for the spatial autocorrelation in the transfer equation using parametric (generalized 
spatial 2SLS) and nonparametric approaches (SHACs). The nonparametric approach (Table 4.4) yields 
better and more expected results than the parametric one (Table 4.3). Therefore, the discussion below 
focuses on the S2SLS estimation of poverty estimation (Table 4.2) and the SHAC estimation of transfer 
equation (Table 4.4).  
Table 4.1—Descriptive statistics 
Variable  Mean  Std. error 
povrt07  15.18887  6.251597 
lpctanf07  3.176876  .8840528 
povrt97  15.06138  6.322115 
lpctanf97  3.281336  .8313643 
lnpcpinc00  10.02023  .2213432 
unemprt00  5.789899  2.621266 
pctfem_un  5.783556  2.732851 
lpopdens00  3.758504  1.58451 
nearestma  78.2587  58.4117 
pctu18  25.54424  3.128666 
pct65ov9  14.96203  4.3163 
bsgrad90  13.36804  6.433141 
pffhhu18  20.69907  7.100266 
Devola  .2732423  .4456985 
homerule  2.552816  1.0096 
revcap97  .742991  .6058711 
fsown97  .3079815  .1833154 
Source: Authors’ estimation. 
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Table 4.2—Poverty regression results from OLS, 2SLS, and S2SLS
7 
Variable  OLS  2SLS  S2SLS 
spatial lag of povrt07      0.035
** 
      (0.016) 
lpctanf07  -0.007  -0.463
***  -0.328
*** 





  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.015) 
lpopdens00  -0.034  0.035  0.024 




















  (0.024)  (0.025)  (0.017) 



















  (0.952)  (0.954)  (0.756) 
R
2  0.860  0.857  0.861 
adj. R
2  0.859  0.856  0.860 
N  3001  3001  3001 
Source: Authors’ estimation. 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
   
                                                       
7 OLS: Ordinary List Squares; 2SLS: Two Stage Least Squares; S2SLS: Spatial Two Stage Least Squares.  
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Table 4.3—Transfer regression results from OLS, 2SLS, S2SLS, and GS2SLS 
Variable  OLS  2SLS  S2SLS  GS2SLS
8 
spatial lag of lpctanf07      0.112
***  0.059
** 
      (0.023)  (0.025) 
povrt07  0.003  -0.015
***  -0.008
**  0.001 






  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.017) 
pctfem_un  -0.024
***  -0.007  -0.010
**  0.001 




*  0.021 




***  0.025 
  (0.059)  (0.060)  (0.057)  (0.061) 
lnpcpinc00  0.037  -0.208
***  -0.140
**  -0.057 






  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.024)  (0.033) 
Homerule  -0.017  -0.021
*  -0.020
**  -0.017 
  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.009)  (0.013) 
_cons  -0.045  2.547
***  1.645
**  0.810 
  (0.662)  (0.743)  (0.686)  (0.693) 
R
2  0.653  0.647  0.676  0.608 
adj. R
2  0.652  0.646  0.675  0.607 
N  3001  3001  3001  3001 
Source: Authors’ estimation. 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Table 4.4—SHAC standard errors for the spatial 2SLS transfer model 
  (1)    (2)    (3)   
  Neighbors=7    Neighbors=14    Neighbors=40   
Parzen kernel             
wy2_lpctanf07  0.112
***  (0.031)  0.112
***  (0.031)  0.112
***  (0.032) 
povrt07  -0.008
**  (0.004)  -0.008
**  (0.004)  -0.008
**  (0.004) 
lpctanf97  0.829
***  (0.026)  0.829
***  (0.026)  0.829
***  (0.026) 
pctfem_un  -0.010
*  (0.006)  -0.010
*  (0.006)  -0.010
*  (0.006) 
revcap97  0.028
*  (0.017)  0.028
*  (0.017)  0.028  (0.018) 
fsown97  0.195
***  (0.058)  0.195
***  (0.059)  0.195
***  (0.064) 
lnpcpinc00  -0.140
**  (0.069)  -0.140
**  (0.070)  -0.140
*  (0.074) 
devola  0.056
**  (0.026)  0.056
**  (0.027)  0.056
*  (0.030) 
homerule  -0.020
*  (0.010)  -0.020
*  (0.011)  -0.020  (0.013) 
Const  1.645
**  (0.719)  1.645
**  (0.723)  1.645
**  (0.770) 
 
   
                                                       
8 GS2SLS: Generalized Spatial Two Stage Least Squares.  
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Table 4.4—Continued 
  (1)    (2)    (3)   
  Neighbors=7    Neighbors=14    Neighbors=40   
Barlett kernel 
wy2_lpctanf07  0.112
***  (0.031)  0.112
***  (0.031)  0.112
***  (0.034) 
povrt07  -0.008
**  (0.004)  -0.008
**  (0.004)  -0.008
**  (0.004) 
lpctanf97  0.829
***  (0.026)  0.829
***  (0.026)  0.829
***  (0.027) 
pctfem_un  -0.010
*  (0.006)  -0.010
*  (0.006)  -0.010  (0.006) 
revcap97  0.028
*  (0.017)  0.028  (0.017)  0.028  (0.020) 
fsown97  0.195
***  (0.059)  0.195
***  (0.061)  0.195
***  (0.071) 
lnpcpinc00  -0.140
**  (0.069)  -0.140
*  (0.072)  -0.140
*  (0.078) 
devola  0.056
**  (0.026)  0.056
**  (0.028)  0.056
*  (0.034) 
homerule  -0.020
*  (0.011)  -0.020
*  (0.012)  -0.020  (0.016) 
Const  1.645
**  (0.718)  1.645
**  (0.746)  1.645




***  (0.031)  0.112
***  (0.031)  0.112
***  (0.035) 
povrt07  -0.008
**  (0.004)  -0.008
**  (0.004)  -0.008
*  (0.004) 
lpctanf97  0.829
***  (0.026)  0.829
***  (0.026)  0.829
***  (0.028) 
pctfem_un  -0.010
*  (0.006)  -0.010
*  (0.006)  -0.010  (0.007) 
revcap97  0.028
*  (0.017)  0.028  (0.018)  0.028  (0.021) 
fsown97  0.195
***  (0.059)  0.195
***  (0.063)  0.195
**  (0.077) 
lnpcpinc00  -0.140
**  (0.069)  -0.140
*  (0.074)  -0.140
*  (0.083) 
devola  0.056
**  (0.027)  0.056
*  (0.029)  0.056  (0.038) 
Homerule  -0.020
*  (0.011)  -0.020  (0.013)  -0.020  (0.018) 
Const  1.645
**  (0.717)  1.645
**  (0.765)  1.645
*  (0.857) 
N  3001    3001    3001   
Source: Authors’ estimation. 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* p < .10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Overall, the results confirm the presence of positive and significant geographical spillovers in 
both the poverty rate and the income transfer; on average, the county’s poverty rate increases by 0.04 
percent when neighboring counties’ poverty rates increase by 1.00 percent. This implies the existence of 
poverty clustering (see Figures 3.1 and 3.2), where counties with similar poverty rates share the same 
poverty dynamics. A recent study by Peters (2009) identifies 12 statistically distinct poverty clusters in 
the United States. Our results also confirm previous findings (Peterson and Rom 1989; Kenworthy 1999 
Osberg 2000; Lichter and Jensen 2002 and Hoynes, Page, and Stevens 2005) that income transfer does 
reduce the poverty rate. The initial condition with respect to the poverty rate matters; the 1997 poverty 
rate significantly affects poverty in 2007, suggesting poverty persistence over the years as reported by 
Cook and Mizer (1994) and Joliffe (2004).   
As shown in previous studies (for example, Ulimwengu 2008; Ulimwengu and Kraybill 2004), 
unemployment has a significant poverty-increasing effect; our results suggest that a marginal change in 
unemployment is expected to induce a change of 0.26 in the poverty rate. A similar result is observed for 
a change in the percentage of female-headed families with children under 18, which has a significant 
positive effect on the poverty rate. As expected, county remoteness as measured by the distance to the 
nearest Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) has a significant effect on poverty; we find that remoteness 
from an urban center is a significant contributing factor to the county’s poverty status. In their survey, 
Weber et al. (2005) conclude that poverty is higher and more persistent in the more remote rural counties.  
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We also find that the stock of human capital, measured here by the percent of population with a 
college degree or more, is negatively correlated with the poverty rate. Lobao and Kraybill (2009) point 
out that counties with higher poverty rates have a less educated population. At the household level, 
Ulimwengu (2009) found that education is critical in preventing entry into persistent poverty. Indeed, 
those with college degrees are less likely to fall into persistent poverty than those with high school or 
middle school diplomas. 
Counties in states that have gone through devolution have experienced lower poverty rates than 
other counties. On the one hand, as shown by Tickamyer et al. (2007), counties located in states 
devolving welfare programs to local governments have substantial resources to combat poverty. On the 
other hand, higher poverty counties report greater pressure from devolution and rising service demands 
(Lobao and Kraybill 2009).  
Findings on income transfer are consistent regardless of the number of neighbors or the nature of 
the kernel approximation used. Although negligible, the impact of the poverty rate on per capita income 
transfer is significant and negative. This suggests that an increase in the number of the poor does reduce 
the amount of transfer available to each poor person.  
Using a non-spatial model, Lobao and Kraybill (2009) found no support for the view that poverty 
hastens a race to the bottom. To the contrary, our results do provide evidence of a race to the bottom 
among counties. We find that a 1.00 percent change in per capita income transfer in neighboring counties 
leads to a 0.11 percent change in per capita income transfer. In other words, in defining its antipoverty 
strategy, each county seems to pay close attention to what is happening in neighboring counties.  
We also find significant inertia or path dependence in the level of income transfer, which 
confirms the finding by Lobao and Kraybill (2009) that past use of strategies strongly influences future 
use. Our results show that the 2007 per capita income transfer is significantly and positively correlated 
with the 1997 per capita income transfer. Similarly, the higher the county’s 1997 general income per 
capita, the higher its 2007 per capita transfer. The same result is observed for the ratio of federal and state 
funds to a county’s own resources. 
Similar to the poverty rate, the percentage of women unemployed, which represents a significant 
share of the poor, tends to reduce the amount of money transferred to each poor person. A1.00 percent 
increase in personal income is expected to reduce per capita income transfer by 0.14 percent. With respect 
to the home rule variable, we find that counties operating under home rule set a lower level of income 
transfer, a result counter to intuition. Devolution counties are found to be more generous than non-
devolution counties. This may explain why devolution counties experience lower poverty rates.    
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5.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The link between government transfers and poverty reduction has been the subject of numerous studies. 
Surprisingly enough, most of these studies failed to account for geographical spillover of both the poverty 
rate and government transfers leading to biased estimates and ultimately to erroneous policy 
recommendations. Moreover, the role of the poverty level in shaping the level of transfer payments has 
been largely ignored. Our findings are in line with theoretical expectations and underscore the importance 
of accounting for feedback simultaneity and spatial autocorrelation. Contrary to previous research, 
focusing on the poverty-reducing impact of income transfer at the state level, which ignores endogeneity 
and spatial spillovers, we find that more generous counties tend to do a better job at reducing poverty and 
that counties with more poor tend to be less generous, which may create incentive for the poor to 
participate in the labor force.   
Overall, the results confirm the presence of significant geographical spillovers in both poverty 
rate and income transfer. Our results also confirm that income transfer does reduce the poverty rate. 
Although negligible, the impact of the poverty rate on per capita income transfer is significant and 
negative. We also find evidence of inertia in both the poverty rate and income transfer.  Our results 
provide evidence of a race to the bottom between counties with respect to income transfer.  
These findings call for a regional or community approach in the fight against poverty. Indeed, a 
common policy agenda is likely to move the welfare equilibrium toward the first best solution whenever 
independent actions generate spillovers. In the presence of cross-county spillovers, efficiency requires 
that jurisdictions agree on policy coordination as opposed to the option of breaking ranks. The Workforce 
Innovation in Regional Economic Development (WIRED) initiative, which stresses the critical role talent 
development plays in creating effective regional economic development strategies, is a perfect example of 
such a common agenda.  
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